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ELECTION AS APPOINTMENT: THE TENNESSEE
PLAN RECONSIDERED
BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK
In 1971, the Tennessee legislature followed the lead of a number of other
states and replaced the direct election of appellate judges with a selection
method called "merit selection."' Tennessee's merit selection system-fittingly
referred to as the "Tennessee Plan"--calls for the governor to appoint all
appellate judges in Tennessee, including state supreme court justices, from a
list of three nominees submitted by a commission predominately comprised of
lawyers.2 After a period of time on the bench, the judges appointed by the
governor have their names put on the ballot in uncontested retention referenda
in which voters are asked whether they wish the judges to remain in office.3 In
light of activity in the most recent legislative session, the Tennessee Plan is
now scheduled to expire on June 30, 2009.4 This is, therefore, an opportune
time to consider whether Tennessee should continue to use the Plan to select
appellate judges.
The Tennessee Plan has been controversial ever since it was enacted in
1971 to replace contested elections. Many people doubt, for example, whether
the Plan has actually accomplished any of its intended purposes. The Plan's
principal purposes are to select better qualified judges, to take the politics out
of judicial selection, and to bring more racial and gender diversity to the
bench.5 Scholars, however, have found little evidence that any of these
purposes are furthered by merit selection plans in general or the Tennessee Plan
in particular.6
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. J.D., 2000, Harvard
Law School. I am grateful to the many people who provided helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this paper. I am also indebted to Sybil Dunlop for her helpful research assistance. Research
for this paper was supported by a grant from the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy.
The views expressed herein are my own.
1. See 1971 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 198.
2. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 14-4-101, -102 (1994 & Supp. 2007).
3. See id. §§ 17-4-114to-116.
4. See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
5. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-101(a) ("It is the declared purpose and intent of the
general assembly by the passage of this chapter to assist the governor in finding and appointing
the best qualified persons available for service on the appellate courts of Tennessee... and...
to insulate the judges of the courts from political influence and pressure.., and.., to make the
courts 'nonpolitical."'); id. § 17-4-102(b)(3) (requiring the speakers of the legislature to appoint
to the judicial nominating commission "persons who approximate the population of the state
with respect to race ... and gender"); id. § 17-4-102(d) (requiring lawyers' organizations to
submit nominees for the judicial nominating commission "with a conscious intention of
selecting a body which reflects a diverse mixture with respect to race... and gender").
6. With respect to the claim that merit selection leads to better qualified judges, scholars
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Nonetheless, perhaps the greatest controversy surrounding the Tennessee
Plan is whether it is even constitutional. The Tennessee constitution states, as it
has since 1853, that all judges "shall be elected by the qualified voters" of the
have found that "the credentials of merit selection judges are not superior to nor substantially
different from those of other judges." Henry R. Glick & Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems
and Judicial Characteristics: The Recruitment of State Supreme Court Judges, 70 JUDICATURE
228, 235 (1987). Moreover, scholars have found that "[j]udges in more partisan systems are
more productive than judges in less partisan systems [such as merit selection]." Stephen J.
Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical
Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary 16 (Univ. of Chi. Sch. of Law, John M.
Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 357, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=-1008989.
With respect to the claim that merit selection takes the politics out ofjudicial selection,
scholars have concluded that "[o]f course [it does] not." Herbert M. Kritzer, Law is the Mere
Continuation of Politics by Different Means: American Judicial Selection in the Twenty-First
Century, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 423,466 (2007). "The politics come into play in determining who
actually gets appointed to the commission... and in how the commission chooses to weigh
various criteria in making both initial nominations and in doing the periodic evaluations." Id.
In other words, "[t]he system is not nonpolitical; it is simply differently political." Id.; see also
HARRY P. STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS 167 (1988) (noting that "far from taking
judicial selection out of politics, [merit selection] actually tend[s] to replace [electoral]
[p]olitics, wherein the judge faces popular election.. ., with a somewhat subterranean process
of bar and bench politics, in which there is little popular control" and "raw political
considerations masquerade[] as professionalism via attorney representation of the
socioeconomic interests of their clients"); Harry 0. Lawson, Methods ofJudicial Selection, 75
MICH. Bus. L.J. 20, 24 (1996) ("Merit selection does not take politics out of the judicial
selection process. It merely changes the nature of the political process involved. It substitutes
bar and elitist politics for those of the electorate as a whole.").
Finally, with respect to the claim that merit selection leads to a more diverse bench,
nationwide studies have proved inconclusive. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Through the Lens of
Diversity: The Fight for Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 10
MICH. J. RACE & L. 55, 85 (2004) ("Studies that have examined the effect of appointment versus
election ofjudges on diversity have produced conflicting results."). In Tennessee, the evidence
likewise is conflicting. In 2007, appellate judges in Tennessee-those selected by the
Tennessee Plan-were more diverse in both race and gender than were trial judges. See
Diversity of the Bench, American Judicature Society, http://www.judicialselection.us/
judicial -selection/bench -diversity/index.cfm?state= (providing data on race and gender of
judges for each state). The opposite was true in both 2004 and 2001. See American Bar
Association, National Database on Judicial Diversity in State Courts, http://www.abanet.org/
judind/diversity/tennessee.html (reporting data for 2004 on racial diversity only); American
Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States, http://www.ajs.org/JSremoved
3.3.08/js/TNdiversity.htm (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE DIRECTORY OFMINORITY
JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. 2001) (reporting data for race and gender in 2001)).
Moreover, complaints by the governor that the Tennessee Plan was not producing sufficient
racial diversity led him to sue the judicial nominating commission in a case that eventually
reached the Tennessee Supreme Court. See Bredesen v. Tenn. Judicial Selection Comm'n, 214
S.W.3d 419 (Tenn. 2007).
[Vol. 75:473
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state.7 The Tennessee Plan, relying as it does on initial appointment by the
governor and retention in an uncontested referendum, would seem to be in
some tension with that language. Given this tension, it is not surprising that the
Tennessee Plan has been mired in litigation ever since its inception, with
several cases challenging the constitutionality of the Plan heard by the
Tennessee Supreme Court.8
In this Essay, I examine the constitutional questions surrounding the
Tennessee Plan. Although the Tennessee Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan on two occasions--once in 19739 and
again in 199610-in neither case did the court's decision command a majority
of regular supreme court justices, 1 and, in the 1996 case, the opinion was not
published and does not constitute binding precedent.' 2 Moreover, and more
importantly, neither of these decisions even attempted to address three of the
most serious constitutional questions raised by the Plan. As I explain, these
questions are not easily answered, and, in my view, suggest that the Tennessee
Plan is unconstitutional in many of its applications.
The first question that the Tennessee Supreme Court has never addressed is
how the constitution permits the governor to appoint all appellate judges in the
first place. Although a provision of the constitution permits the governor to
appoint judges to fill "vacancies," it appears that the constitution uses the word
"vacancies" to refer only to interim vacancies-i.e., where judges leave in the
middle of their terms-rather than to positions that are vacant simply because
judges choose not to run for reelection.1 3 It would seem, then, that, to the
extent the Tennessee Plan permits the governor to make appointments to fill
vacancies created b 4judges who leave office at the end of their terms, the Plan
is unconstitutional. This issue has never come before the Tennessee Supreme
Court because both the 1973 and 1996 cases involved judges appointed to fill
interim vacancies.15
The second question that the Tennessee Supreme Court has never
addressed is how retention referenda can be squared with the original
understanding and purposes of the constitutional requirement of an "election."
In 1870, when the current constitutional provision was enacted, the idea of
retention referenda for public officials was unknown in the United States.' 6 As
7. TENN. CONST. art. VI. §§ 3, 4.
8. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson, No. 0IS01-9605-CH-00106, 1996 WL
570090 (Tenn. Oct. 2, 1996); State ex rel. Higgins v. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn. 1973).
9. See Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480.
10. See Thompson, 1996 WL 570090.
11. See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 162-68.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 161-67.
15. See infra text accompanying note 167.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 182-183. The idea was first conceived in 1914.
See id.
2008]
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such, it would have been impossible for the authors of this provision to have
intended such a device when they used the word "election." Although many
scholars believe it should not be necessary to amend the constitution to permit
the legislature to take advantage of every new way of doing things, it is
doubtful whether retention referenda even serve the democratic purposes of the
1870 constitution.' 7 As an historical matter, retention referenda were originally
designed not to facilitate democratic accountability, but, rather, to insulate
judges from such accountability.' 8 It is therefore not surprising that, in
Tennessee and elsewhere, judges who run in retention referenda are virtually
never defeated.19
Finally, the Tennessee Supreme Court has never explained how the
Tennessee Plan can be constitutional in light of the fact that, in 1977, the voters
in Tennessee rejected a constitutional amendment that would have repealed the
constitutional provision requiring elected judges in favor of provisions
permitting the Tennessee Plan.20 This is in stark contrast to each of the sixteen
other states that select judges through a method of initial appointment by the
governor followed by a retention referendum; each of these states has amended
its constitution to change provisions requiring elected judges in favor of
provisions permitting the appointment-retention method of selection. 2'
None of these questions is easily answered, and, together, they comprise a
compelling case for the view that many appellate judges in Tennessee have
been selected in an unconstitutional manner for the better part of four decades.
For this reason, I argue that the Tennessee legislature should allow the
Tennessee Plan to expire next year and, in doing so, return the selection of
appellate judges to contested elections.22 In my view, the legislature should
employ contested elections to select all judges in the state at least until the
voters of Tennessee have been given another opportunity to amend the
Tennessee constitution-and perhaps beyond that point if the voters again
reject the amendment.
In Part I of this Essay, I briefly recount the history ofjudicial selection in
Tennessee. Like most states that entered the Union in the founding era,
Tennessee originally appointed all of its judges, but then switched to elections
as the populism of home-grown "Jacksonian Democracy" spread across
America. 23 Tennessee only turned to merit selection-a Progressive Era reform
seeking to place greater control over government in the hands of "experts"-
late in the twentieth century.24 In Part II, I describe the provisions of the
Tennessee Plan. Although many of the provisions have been revised over the
17. See infra text accompanying notes 184-202.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 204-11.
21. See infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 27-39.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 52-70.
[Vol. 75:473
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years, the core of the Tennessee Plan-appointment by the governor from a list
of names supplied by a lawyer-dominated commission followed by a retention
referendum-remains the same.25 In Part III, I recount the litigation over the
constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan, including the two Tennessee Supreme
Court decisions upholding it.26 In Part IV, I explain why these two decisions
have left a series of important constitutional questions unanswered. In Part V, I
conclude that the constitutional case against the Tennessee Plan is strong, and I
argue that the legislature should allow it to expire and return the state to
contested elections until Tennessee voters decide to amend the state
constitution.
I. THE HISTORY OF JUDICIAL SELECTION IN TENNESSEE
At the time of the founding, judges throughout the new United States came
to the bench either by executive or legislative appointment, and they often held• • 27
their positions for life. The first Tennessee constitution, ratified in 1796 when
Tennessee became the nation's sixteenth state, granted judges life tenure (so
long as they exhibited "good behavior") and placed the power to select those
judges exclusively in the hands of the state legislature.28
While the federal judicial system has stayed the same over the ensuing two
hundred years, the state judicial systems changed radically in the first half of
the nineteenth century. 29 By the time of the Civil War, the vast majority of
states had changed their method of judicial selection from executive or
legislative appointment to direct election by the people.3 °
In some ways, this dramatic shift in the states was a phenomenon with its
roots in Tennessee: Most historians attribute the change in judicial selection to
a shift in this country's attitude about democracy that was inspired by
Tennessean Andrew Jackson. At the time of the founding, democracy was an
ideal embraced only tentatively by the political elite.3' It was not until the
nineteenth century, during the populist movement led by Andrew Jackson, that
the country began to emphatically embrace the notion that ordinary citizens
25. See infra text accompanying notes 76-104.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 115-53.
27. See EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 98 (1944); Larry C.
Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States: A Special Report, 64 JUDICATURE 176, 176
(1980). Before it became a state, Vermont briefly selected judges by election. See HAYNES,
supra, at 99.
28. See TENN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1976) ("The general assembly shall by joint ballot of
both houses appoint judges of the several courts of law and equity ... who shall hold their
respective offices during their good behavior.").
29. See Berkson, supra note 27, at 176.
30. See id. ("By the time of the Civil War, 24 of 34 states had established an elected
judiciary with seven states adopting the system in 1850 alone.").
31. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 21-25 (2000) (explaining that the American Revolution
"produced modest, but only modest, gains in the formal democratization of politics").
2008]
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were fully capable of making decisions about their government.32 According to
historians, this populist movement (dubbed "Jacksonian Democracy") that
restructured so many American institutions was also responsible for the tide of
elected judiciaries that washed across America in the middle of the nineteenth
century.33
The tide did not begin in Tennessee, however. The first state to select any
of its judges by election was Georgia in 1812, and the first state to select all of
them in that manner was Mississippi in 1832.35 Tennessee first considered
proposals to select its judges by election at its second Constitutional
Convention in 1834.36 The proposals failed to pass, and the Convention
ultimately voted to continue selecting judges by legislative appointment.37
Tennessee did not make the change to an elected judiciary until 1853.38 In that
year, the people of Tennessee approved a constitutional amendment providing
that all judges in the state "shall be elected by the qualified voters" to terms of
eight years.39
After the Civil War, Tennessee held another Constitutional Convention to
bring its constitution into compliance with the requirements demanded by the
federal Reconstruction Congress.40 The Convention of 1870 maintained the
provision requiring the election of all judges,41 and the 1870 language has not
been changed since then.42 Thus, the Tennessee constitution still declares that
32. See id. at 33-42, 74 (outlining the expansion of suffrage).
33. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 785 (2002) ("Starting with
Georgia in 1812, States began to provide for judicial election, a development rapidly accelerated
by Jacksonian democracy."); CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE
RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 4 (1997) (noting that "the Jacksonian movement
... encouraged more popular control ofjudges"); Berkson, supra note 27, at 176 (noting that
people "were determined to end [the] privilege of the upper class and to ensure the popular
sovereignty we describe as Jacksonian Democracy"); Rachel Paine Caufield, How the Pickers
Pick: Finding A Set of Best Practices for Judicial Nominating Commissions, 34 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 163, 167 (2007) ("States began to move away from appointive selection methods in the
mid-1800s with the rise of Jacksonian democracy and its emphasis on democratic
accountability, individual equality, and direct voter participation in governmental decision-
making.").
34. See HAYNES, supra note 27, at 99-100.
35. See id.
36. See Timothy S. Huebner, Judicial Independence in an Age of Democracy,
Sectionalism, and War, in A HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT 66 (James W. Ely Jr.
ed., 2002); N. Houston Parks, Judicial Selection-The Tennessee Experience, 7 MEM. ST. U. L.
REv. 615, 624 (1977).
37. See id. The 1834 Convention did, however, eliminate life tenure for judges in favor of
twelve- and eight-year terms. See id.
38. See Huebner, supra note 36, at 87; Parks, supra note 36, at 626-28.
39. Id.
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all judges-whether on the "supreme court" or "inferior courts.-"shall be
elected by the qualified voters" of the state to a term of eight years.43
Throughout the next one hundred years, judges in Tennessee were selected,
at least in theory, by voters in contested elections similar to those held for other
public offices." But the actual practice ofjudicial elections did not necessarily
comport with the theory. As one commentator has noted, "[e]lection campaigns
generally were not very partisan. In fact, incumbent judges usually ran with no,
or only nominal opposition. '45 (After all, for much of the post-Civil War era,
Tennessee was a one-party state; thus, whichever candidate was nominated by
the Democratic Party was all but certain to win a judgeship.46) Moreover, most
judges in Tennessee were elevated to the bench after 1853 not by election, but
by gubernatorial appointment to fill interim vacancies.47 Since 1834, the
Tennessee constitution has permitted the legislature to direct how such interim
vacancies should be filled,48 and, from the very beginning, the legislature
vested that power with the governor.49 Consequently, one commentator has
reported that, in the first one hundred years of judicial elections in Tennessee,
"nearly 60 percent of the regular judges who ... served on [the] Supreme Court
[were] appointed by the Governor in the first instance., 50 This conflict between
the theory and reality of judicial elections was not a phenomenon unique to
Tennessee; many judges in states with elected judiciaries also were elevated by
appointment to unexpired terms.5'
43. TENN. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3,4.
44. See Parks, supra note 36, at 628-29.
45. Id. at 629.
46. See id. at 630 ("Since after the Civil War [Tennessee] was generally controlled by the
Democratic Party, nomination by the Democrats to a seat on the bench was tantamount to
election.").
47. See id. at 629 ("[T]hose elected most often had reached the bench initially though
gubernatorial appointment.").
48. The 1796 constitution made no provision for the filling of vacancies. Thus, all
vacancies had to be filled by the manner set forth for initial appointment, i.e., by appointment of
both houses of the legislature. See Smith v. Normant, 13 Tenn. 271, 272-73 (Tenn. 1833)
(holding that, in the case of vacancies, the "constitution has made no exception in favor of the
legislature giving authority by law to an agent to appoint judges" and "[t]he two houses acting
jointly, and voting by ballot, is the only appointing power under the constitution"). By 1834,
the constitution permitted the legislature to prescribe the manner of filling vacancies that arose
by reason of "death, resignation, or removal." TENN. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (1834). The current
(1870) constitution likewise permits the legislature to prescribe the manner of filling all
vacancies. See id. ("[The] filling of all vacancies not otherwise directed or provided by this
Constitution, shall be made in such manner as the Legislature shall direct.").
49. See Parks, supra note 36, at 629.
50. Id. at 629 (quoting William H. Wicker, Constitutional Revision and the Courts, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SixTH ANNUAL SouTHERN INSTITUTE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 12, 14
(Bureau of Public Administration, University of Tennessee - Knoxville, 1947)).
51. See SusAN B. CARBON & LARRY C. BERKSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 14 (1980) (noting that, "in the 30 states which employ partisan and nonpartisan
2008]
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Despite the states' limited experience with contested judicial elections-or
perhaps because of it-the trend in favor of elected judiciaries began to wane in
America in the early twentieth century. During the Progressive Era,
professional lawyers' organizations across the country began to advocate for a
new method of judicial selection.5 2 The new method was intended to take
selection out of the political process, whether that process was political
appointment or popular election.5 3  The proponents of this new method
believed that judges should be selected by "experts"; 54 in particular, they
thought that the lawyers' organizations themselves should make the selections.
These organizations called the method whereby they would selectjudges "merit
selection." In 1937, the nation's largest organization of law5yers, the American
Bar Association, formally endorsed merit selection plans, and in 1940, the
state of Missouri became the first of many states to change its method of
judicial selection from popular election to merit selection.5 With the heavy
support of lawyers' organizations in the state,57 Tennessee first adopted a merit
selection plan in 1971.58
The merit selection plans adopted by these states did not turn judicial
selection entirely over to local lawyers' organizations. Rather, the plans
typically charged the state's governor with appointing judges from a list of
names submitted by a nominating commission comprised largely of members of
local lawyers' organizations.5 9 Moreover, although many of the architects of
merit selection favored life tenure for judges appointed in this manner, they
suspected the public would balk at being entirely excluded from a role in
choosing such important public officials.60 Thus, the architects of merit
selection designed a mechanism that they thought would result in life tenure but
without the appearance of life tenure: the retention referendum. In a retention
referendum, ajudge runs unopposed and the electorate is simply asked whether
the judge should remain on the bench. 61 That is, the public votes on retention
elections to fill most of their judiciaries, a substantial number ofjudges actually reach the bench
by appointment").
52. See id at 3-6.
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., Luke Bierman, Judicial Independence: Beyond Merit Selection, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 854 (2002) (noting that the reform movement in the Progressive Era
was based on the hope that "experts, rather than voters, would be responsible for selecting
judges").
55. See CARBON & BERKSON, supra note 51, at 4.
56. Seeid. at 11.
57. See John R. Vile, The Tennessee Supreme Court, 1946-1974: Tranquility Amid a
National Judicial Revolution, in A HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT 268 (James W.
Ely Jr. ed., 2002).
58. See Parks, supra note 36, at 615 & n.l .
59. See STUMPF, supra note 6, at 163 (describing the chief features of merit-selection
plans).
60. See CARBON & BERKSON, supra note 51, at 6-8.
61. See id.
[Vol. 75:473
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without any knowledge of who might replace the judge if he or she is voted out
of office.62 Under these circumstances, the public nearly always votes in favor
of retention.63 Again, this was not a surprise to the architects of merit selection.
As historians have explained, "many proponents of the commission plan would
have preferred good behavior tenure in lieu of retention elections"; "[t]hey
perceived retention as a 'sop' to those committed to electoral control over the
judiciary." 64
As explained in more detail in Part II of this Essay, the merit selection plan
adopted by Tennessee in 197 1-fittingly referred to as the "Tennessee Plan"--
is much like the plans in other states. Similar to other plans, judges are initially
appointed by the governor from a list of names submitted by a judicial
nominating commission.65 These judges must then run in retention referenda
some period of time thereafter.66 The 1971 Tennessee Plan applied to judges
67on both the intermediate appellate courts and the state supreme court. In
1974, the Plan for the supreme court was repealed,68 but it was reenacted in
6971994. 69 The Plan has never been adopted for the selection of trial judges.70
Unlike every other state that has adopted a method ofjudicial selection that
relies on initial appointment followed by a retention referendum, 7I Tennessee
has never amended its constitution to replace the provision requiring that all
state judges shall be elected.72 Indeed, not only has the constitution never been
amended, but the voters of Tennessee rejected such an amendment in 1977. In
that year, a limited Constitutional Convention was called to make several
changes to the 1870 constitution. 73 The Convention proposed thirteen different
62. See id.
63. See Larry Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention Elections, 1964-1998,83 JUDICATURE
79, 79 & n.1 (1999) (finding that in 4,588 retention referenda in a sample often states over
thirty-four years, only fifty-two judges were not retained).
64. CARBON & BERKSON, supra note 51, at 6-8. Although Missouri was the first state to
adopt a merit selection plan, California was the first state to use retention referenda. See id. at
11. California began using the referenda in 1934 when they were proposed by a group of
citizens that included Earl Warren, who would eventually become Chief Justice of the United
States. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Supreme Court Retention Elections in California, 28 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 333, 339 (1988).
65. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-112(a) (1994 & Supp. 2007).
66. See id. §§17-4-114to-116.
67. See 1971 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 198.
68. See 1974 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 433, § 1.
69. See generally 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942.
70. The one exception is when the governor fills interim vacancies in the trial courts.
Since 1994, the governor has been required to fill interim vacancies using the judicial
nominating commission. Even so, all trial judges must still run for reelection in contested
elections. See infra note 85.
71. See infra note 213.
72. See TENN. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3, 4.
73. See LEwis L. LASKA, THE TENNESSEE STATE CONSTrUTION 23-27 (1990) (outlining
the history and proceedings of Tennessee's 1977 limited Constitutional Convention).
2008]
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amendments to the people of Tennessee on a variety of topics, including one
that would have, among other things, replaced the language guaranteeing an
elected judiciary with language providing for the Tennessee Plan.74 The voters
approved every one of the thirteen amendments except the one that would have
replaced the language on elected judges with the provisions of the Tennessee
Plan; this amendment failed by a margin of 55% to 45%.75
II. THE TENNESSEE PLAN
As originally enacted by the legislature in 1971, the Tennessee Plan called
for all "vacancies" on the intermediate appellate courts and supreme court to be
filled by the governor.76 The Plan described "vacancies" not only as interim
vacancies-i.e., instances where a judge left in the middle of an eight-year
term-but also as instances where the judge completed an eight-year term and
did not run for reelection. 7 That is, the Tennessee Plan required the governor
to initially appoint all judges on the intermediate appellate courts and the
supreme court.
In making the appointments, the governor was required to select one of
three persons submitted by a judicial nominating commission.78 Under the
1971 legislation, the nominating commission was comprised of nine members:
three members of the legislature, three attorneys elected by their peers, and
three others appointed by the governor, only one of whom could be a lawyer.79
The judges appointed by the governor were permitted to serve until the next
biennial general election, at which time they would face referenda where voters
74. The proposal would have amended Article VI of the Tennessee constitution by
deleting Sections 1-15 and substituting language stating, among other things, that "Justices of
the Supreme Court and judges of the Court of Appeals shall be appointed by the Governor from
three nominees recommended... by the Appellate Court Nominating Commission," and that
"[tihe name of each justice and judge seeking retention shall be submitted to the qualified voters
for retention or rejection...." Governor Ray Blanton, Proclamation by the Governor, in THE
LIMITED CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1977, STATE OF TENNESSEE, THE JOURNAL OF THE
DEBATES OF THE LIMITED CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1977 (see Proposal 13, § 4).
75. See id. (noting that the amendment received 157,581 votes in favor and 190,421 votes
against).
76. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-712 (1972).
77. See id. §§ 17-712, -716.
78. See id. § 17-712. As originally enacted, the statute permitted the governor to reject
names from the commission indefinitely. See id. The statute now permits the governor to reject
only one list of three names; the governor is required to select someone from the second list
submitted by the commission. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-112 (1994). This requirement was
the subject of recent litigation between the governor and the judicial nominating commission
that ultimately reached the Tennessee Supreme Court. See Bredesen v. Tenn. Judicial Selection
Comm'n, 214 S.W.3d 419 (Tenn. 2007) (holding, inter alia, that the commission could not
include a person on the second list of names sent to the governor if that person had been on the
first list as well).
79. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-702 (1972).
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would be asked only: "Shall (Name of Candidate) be elected and retained in
office as (name of Office)? Vote Yes or No."80 If a majority of voters voted to
retain the judge, the judge would serve for the remainder of an eight-year term,
at which time the judge would face another retention referendum. 1Ifthe judge
was not retained, then the governor would appoint a new judge from a list of
three names submitted by the nominating commission.
Much of the 1971 legislation remains intact today, but there have been
several important changes to the Tennessee Plan since then. First, in 1974, the
legislature amended the Plan to revoke its applicability to vacancies on the
supreme court.83 The legislature would not add the supreme court back until
1994.84 Thus, for twenty years, the Plan applied only to the intermediate
appellate courts. Today, the Tennessee Plan applies to both the intermediate
appellate courts and the supreme court. It has never been extended to trial
courts.8 5
Second, the legislature has significantly reworked the nominating
commission that supplies the list of names from which the governor must
appoint judges. In 2001, the nominating commission was expanded to its
present size of seventeen members.86 Although legislators no longer serve on
the commission, the two speakers of the legislature select all seventeen
members.87 Fourteen members must be lawyers, leaving only three non-88
lawyers. Twelve of the fourteen lawyer members must come from names
supplied by five special lawyers' organizations.8 9 Two members must be taken
from names submitted by the Tennessee Bar Association, one from the
Tennessee Defense Lawyers Association, three from the Tennessee Trial
Lawyers Association, three from the Tennessee District Attorneys General
Conference, and three from the Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers.90 The two remaining lawyer members need not be taken from one of
these groups.9' Each lawyers' organization is required to compose these lists
"with a conscious intention of selecting a body which reflects a diverse mixture
80. Id. §§ 17-714to-716.
81. See id.
82. See id. §§ 17-714 to -715 (stating that such a situation would create a "vacancy," and
that, per § 17-712, the governor would fill that vacancy).
83. See 1974 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 433, § 1.
84. See generally 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942.
85. The one exception is interim appointments to fill unexpired terms, which, since 1994,
the legislature has required the governor to fill through the judicial nominating commission.
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-118(a) (1994). Unlike interim appellate appointments, however,
all trial judges must run for reelection in contested elections. See id. § 17-4-118(e).
86. See id. § 17-4-102(a) (Supp. 2007).
87. See id. § 17-4-102(b).
88. See id. § 17-4-102(a)(5) (noting that "[t]hree (3) members... shall not be lawyers").
89. See id. § 17-4-102(a)(l)-(4).
90. See id.
91. See id. § 17-4-102(a)(6).
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with respect to race ... and gender"; 92 the speakers are likewise required to
appoint from these lists "persons who approximate the population of the state
with respect to race.., and gender."93 Each commission member serves a term
of six years.94
Third, in 1994, the legislature created a new "judicial evaluation
commission" to publish an evaluation of all judges before they run in their
required retention referenda. 95 If the evaluation commission recommends that
the public retain ajudge, then the judge runs in a retention referendum. 96 If the
commission does not recommend that the public retain ajudge, however, then
the general election laws apply and the judge runs in a contested, partisan
election.97 Given that judges who run in retention referenda virtually never
lose,98 the evaluation commission can make a big difference as to whether a
judge stays on the bench. The evaluation commission is comprised of twelve
members, only four of whom are non-lawyers. 99 The members are selected by
the speakers and the Tennessee Judicial Council,'00 an advisory body created to
advise the legislature on judicial administration.'0 ' Four of the members must
be selected from lists proposed by many of the same special lawyers'
organizations that propose names for the judicial nominating commission.,0 2
As with the nominating commission, those selecting the evaluation commission
"shall endeavor to make appointments and submit nominees . . . that
approximate the population of the state with respect to race and gender."'
10 3
Evaluation commission members serve six-year terms. 104
Since the judicial evaluation commission was created in 1994, the
commission has evaluated sixty-six judges. In every single one of these sixty-
six evaluations, the commission recommended that the judge be retained.' 0 '
92. Id. § 17-4-102(d).
93. Id. § 17-4-102(b)(3). These statutory provisions, which appear to set forth racial and
gender quotas for service on the judicial nominating commission, themselves raise
constitutional questions. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486
(1989) (striking down racial set aside in government contracting); Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (striking down racial quota in
medical school admissions).
94. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-106(a) (Supp. 2007).
95. Id. § 17-4-201.
96. See id. §§ 17-4-114(c), -115(c).
97. See id.
98. See infra text accompanying notes 107-08, 189-93.
99. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-201(b)(1)-(4) (Supp. 2007).
100. See id. § 17-4-201(b)(2)-(4).
101. Seeid. § 16-21-101.
102. See id. §§ 17-4-102(a)-(b), -201(b)(3)-(4).
103. Id. § 17-4-201(b)(7). These apparent racial and gender quotas may themselves be
unconstitutional. See supra note 93.
104. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-201(b)(8) (Supp. 2007).
105. See TENN. JUDICIAL EVALUATION COMM'N, TENNESSEE APPELLATE JUDGES
EVALUATION REPORT (1998) (on file with Tennessee Law Review) (recommending the retention
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Since the Tennessee Plan was created in 1971, there have been 146
retention referenda. 10 6 In 145 of the 146 referenda, the public voted in favor of
retention, a retention rate of 99.3%. 107 The only exception was in 1996, when
55% of the public voted against retaining a supreme court justice, Penny
White. 1
08
The Tennessee legislature permitted the statutes creating the judicial
nominating and judicial evaluation commissions to expire on June 30, 2008.109
Nonetheless, the commissions continue to operate until June 2009 under a
provision of the law that allows them to wind down their activities for one
year. 10 Unless the legislature acts to save the commissions next year, it
appears that the Tennessee Plan will terminate at that time. If the legislature
of four supreme court justices, ten court of appeals judges, and twelve court of criminal appeals
judges); TENN. JUDICIAL EVALUATION COMM'N, TENNESSEE APPELLATE JUDGES EVALUATION
REPORT (2000), available at http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/geninfo/JudEval/judeval2000.pdf (last
visited May 13, 2008) (recommending the retention of two court of appeals judges and four
court of criminal appeals judges); TENN. JUDICIAL EVALUATION COMM'N, TENNESSEE APPELLATE
JUDGES EVALUATION REPORT (2004) (on file with Tennessee Law Review) (recommending the
retention of two court of appeals judges); TENN. JUDICIAL EVALUATION COMM'N, TENNESSEE
APPELLATE JUDGES EVALUATION REPORT (2006), available at http://www.tncourts.gov/
geninfo/Publications/judeval/judEval2006b.pdf (last visited May 13, 2008) (recommending the
retention of three supreme court justices, twelve court of appeals judges, and twelve court of
criminal appeals judges); TENN. JUDICIAL EVALUATION COMM'N, TENNESSEE APPELLATE JUDGES
EVALUATION REPORT (2008), available at http://www.tncourts.gov/geninfo/Publications/
JudicialEvaluation/2008%2OFinal%20Report.pdf (last visited May 13, 2008) (recommending
the retention of two supreme court justices, two court of appeals judges, and one court of
criminal appeals judge).
106. Telephone interview with Tim Gregory, Tennessee Division of Elections (Dec. 11,
2007) (transcript on file with Tennessee Law Review).
107. Id.
108. See SECRETARY OF STATE, TENNESSEE BLUE BOOK 1996-1997, at 543 (listing results
for the August 1, 1996, general election). For an account of the controversial ruling that led to
Justice White's defeat, see Carl A. Pierce, The Tennessee Supreme Court and the Struggle for
Independence, Accountability, and Modernization, 1974-1998, in A HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE
SUPREME COURT 308-11 (James W. Ely Jr. ed., 2002).
109. The commissions were scheduled to expire on June 30, 2008, see TENN. CODE ANN. §
4-29-229(a)(46)-(47) (Supp. 2007), and after much hand wringing, the legislature refused to
extend them. See, e.g., John Rodgers, Wilder's Last Gasp on State Judges Falls Short,
NASHVILLE CITY PAPER, May 21, 2008, available at http://www.nashvillecitypaper.com/
news.php?viewStory=60360; John Rodgers, Wilder's Judicial Plan on Rocks as Senate Tempers
Ignite, NASHVILLE CITY PAPER, May 14,2008, available at http://www/nashvillecitypaper.com/
news.php?viewStory=60187.
110. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-29-112 (2005) ("Upon the termination of any governmental
entity under the provisions of this chapter, it shall continue in existence until June 30 of the next
succeeding calendar year for the purpose of winding up its affairs. During that period,
termination shall not diminish, reduce, or limit the powers or authorities of each respective
governmental entity.").
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does not enact a new system in the meantime, the selection of appellate judges
will most likely return by default to the prior system of contested elections."'
III. LITIGATION AGAINST THE TENNESSEE PLAN
Although the Tennessee Plan has been in operation since 1971, the
language from the 1870 Tennessee constitution that requires all judges in the
state to be "elected by the qualified voters" has never been changed.'
12
(Indeed, a proposed amendment that would have changed this language in favor
of lanuage providing for the Tennessee Plan was rejected by voters in
1977.'3) For this reason, the Tennessee Plan has always operated under a
cloud of legal uncertainty. Indeed, on three occasions since 1971, the
Tennessee Plan's constitutionality has been tested in litigation. 1
4
The earliest and most important litigation was State ex rel. Higgins v.
Dunn.115 In Dunn, a supreme court justice, Larry Creson, passed away in June
1972, some two years before his term was set to expire on August 31, 1974.116
Governor Winfield Dunn appointed Thomas Turley, Jr., to fill the position from
a list of names submitted by the judicial nominating commission, but the
governor did not make the appointment effective until September." 7 In the
111. This is the case because the old statutory provisions requiring appellate judges to be
selected by election are still on the books. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-1-103 (1994 &
Supp. 2007) ("The judges of the supreme court, court of appeals, and court of criminal appeals
are elected by the qualified voters of the state at large .... "); see also, e.g., id. § § 16-3-101, 16-
4-102, 16-5-103. Although these provisions were repealed to the extent they conflict with the
Tennessee Plan, see 1971 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 198, § 17, the Tennessee Plan instructs the
courts to return to contested elections if any provision of the Plan is held "invalid," see 1994
Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942, § 23. It is true that allowing part of the Tennessee Plan to expire is
not the same thing as a court holding part of the Plan "invalid," but it does suggest that the
legislative intent behind the Tennessee Plan was to have all of it or none at all. This was also
the assumption of one of the special courts that was asked to rule on the constitutionality of the
Tennessee Plan; the special supreme court in DeLaney noted that, if the Tennessee Plan was by
its terms inapplicable to a particular appellate vacancy, then the vacancy would be filled with a
contested election. See DeLaney v. Thompson, 982 S.W.2d 857, 858 (Tenn. 1998) ("[T]he
failure of the Commission to recommend the retention of any judge would render the Tennessee
Plan inapplicable to the election to fill that judge's seat, and the election therefore would be
conducted as any other election (rather than as a 'retention election').").
112. See TENN. CONST. art. VI, §§3, 4.
113. See Constitutional Amendments Proposed by the Convention for Submission to the
People, in THE LIMITED CONSTITtmONAL CONVENTION OF 1977, STATE OF TENNESSEE, THE
JOURNAL OF THE LIMITED CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION of 1977 (see Article VI, § 4).
114. See DeLaney v. Thompson, 982 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1998); State ex. rel. Hooker v.
Thompson, No. 01S01-9605-CH-00106, 1996 WL 570090 (Tenn. Oct. 2, 1996); State ex. rel.
Higgins v. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn. 1973).
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meantime, there was an August general election, and, despite the fact that there
was no ballot question for the vacant supreme court position, Robert Taylor ran
a write-in campaign for the seat."18 The secretary of state certified Taylor to the
position, the governor certified Turley, and the entire matter went to the
Tennessee Supreme Court for resolution.19 The court held both that the
governor's appointment was invalid (because the governor could not appoint
someone to a vacancy beyond the time for the next general election) and that
the write-in election was invalid (because the supreme court position had not
been put on the ballot).120
Although it did not appear necessary to its decision, the Dunn court also
considered the constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan. 12 1 The court found the
Plan constitutional for two reasons. First, the court found that it was
constitutional for the governor to initially appoint judges--despite the language
of the constitution requiring their election-because the constitution elsewhere
gives the legislature the power to prescribe how "all vacancies not otherwise
directed or provided by this Constitution" shall be filled. 122 In the court's view,
when Justice Creson passed away, a vacancy was created, and the broad powers
of this provision kicked in.' 23 The court noted that governors had been filling
interim vacancies for over one hundred years. 1
24
Second, the court found that the "yes or no" retention referendum that takes
place under the Tennessee Plan at the next scheduled election qualifies as an
"election" under the constitutional provision requiring all judges to be "elected
by the qualified voters.' ' 125 Although contested judicial elections had always
been used under the 1870 constitution before the advent of the Tennessee Plan,
the court noted that that the word "elected" in the constitution was not
specifically defined, and, therefore, was ambiguous. 126 The court further noted
that three other provisions of the constitution use the word "election" to refer to
other ballot matters where voters are asked only a "yes or no" question; 127 in
these provisions, voters are asked ballot questions such as whether to approve
amendments to the constitution 128 or to authorize municipalities to lend
118. See id.
119. See id. at 482-83.
120. See id. at 487, 491.
121. See id. at 487.
122. See id. at 487-88 (quoting TENN. CONST. art. VII, § 4).
123. See id. at 488 ("[T]he Legislature as authorized by Article 7, Section 4, exercised the
authority vested in it to make provision for 'the filling of all vacancies not otherwise directed or
provided for by this Constitution."').
124. See id. at 487-88.
125. See id. at 488 (quoting TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3).
126. See id. at 489 ("The Constitution of Tennessee does not define the words, 'elect',
'election', or 'elected' and we have not found nor have we been referred to any provision of the
Constitution or of a statute or to any decision of one of our appellate courts defining these
words.").
127. See id.
128. See TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
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credit.12 9 In light of these other provisions, the court thought that the word
"election" could encompass a "yes or no" vote for a public official as well. 3 °
This was especially the case in light of another provision of the constitution
giving the legislature the power to direct the "manner" of "election of all
officers . . . not otherwise directed or provided by this Constitution."'' The
court concluded that, to the extent the legislature was given discretion in the
constitution over prescribing the format of elections, the legislature was within
its rights to choose retention referenda.1
32
One justice dissented in Dunn. Justice Humphreys argued that"the part of
the Plan that does away with the popular election of judges, and substitutes a
recall election, is so obviously contrary to the arrangement in our Constitution
• .. for the people to have the right both to nominate and elect their
constitutional officers" that the unconstitutionality of the Tennessee Plan was
"obvious."' 33 Justice Humphreys came to this view because the constitution
requires the election not onl' of judges, but of other civil officers, including
members of the legislature. 13 He argued that, if members of the legislature can
abolish contested elections for judicial positions, then presumably they could
do so for other positions, including their own, a result that he thought was
clearly inconsistent with the constitution.
35
After Dunn, the Tennessee legislature repealed the Tennessee Plan insofar
as it applied to "vacancies" on the supreme court. 136 The legislature would not
reauthorize the Plan for supreme court vacancies until 1994,137 and when it did,
it inspired a new round of litigation over the Plan's constitutionality. In 1996,
the suits in State ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson 38 were filed by Lewis Laska and
John Jay Hooker, two lawyers who wished to run for a seat then occupied by
Justice Penny White (who, under the Tennessee Plan, would run only in a
retention referendum). 39 The litigation went up to the Tennessee Supreme
Court and was heard by a special panel of judges appointed by the governor
because all of the regular justices recused themselves. 40 The special court held
the Tennessee Plan constitutional on the authority of Dunn.'41 The Thompson
129. See id. art. II, § 29.
130. See Dunn, 496 S.W.2d at 489 ("It seems to us that if the Constitution itself
denominates these methods of ratification as elections, it cannot be that Chapter 198 is
unconstitutional because the elections therein provided for are limited to approval or
disapproval.").
131. TENN. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
132. See Dunn, 496 S.W.2d at 489.
133. Id. at 493 (Humphreys, J., dissenting).
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See 1974 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 433, § 1.
137. See generally 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942.
138. No. O1SO1-9605-CH-00106, 1996 WL 570090 (Tenn. Oct. 2, 1996).
139. See id. at *1.
140. See id. at *1 n.6.
141. See Thompson, 1996 WL 570090, at *3 ("The issue of whether yes/no retention
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opinion has never, however, been published in the official Tennessee Supreme
Court reporter.142 As a result, it is not considered binding precedent.
4
s
The final piece of significant litigation challenging the constitutionality of
the Tennessee Plan came in 1998, in DeLaney v. Thompson.144 In this case, a
court of appeals judge planned to retire at the end of his term, and the plaintiff,
Robert DeLaney, sought to run for his seat. 45  The state coordinator of
elections denied his application for the seat, and DeLaney sued. 146 The trial
court held the Tennessee Plan unconstitutional, not because it denied the voters
an election, but because it restricted the candidates who could seek a position
on an appellate court to those selected by the judicial nominating
commission. 147 The court of appeals, sitting as a special court in light of the
recusals of the regular members, reversed and upheld the Tennessee Plan on the
authority and arguments of Dunn and Thompson.148 But the Tennessee
Supreme Court, sitting as a special court as well, reversed the court of appeals
on other grounds, finding it unnecessary to reach the constitutional question. 1
49
It is interesting to note that, despite all this litigation, a majority of the
regularly constituted Supreme Court has never upheld the constitutionality of
the Tennessee Plan. In both Thompson and Dunn, the justices that upheld the
constitutionality of the Plan were comprised largely of special justices
appointed to hear only those particular cases. 150 In Thompson, as I noted, all
elections violate the Constitution of Tennessee has previously been decided by the Tennessee
Supreme Court in the case of State ex rel. Higgins v. Dunn, and no compelling reason has been
given to persuade this Court that it should disturb that ruling." (citation omitted)).
142. See generally Thompson, 1996 WL 570090.
143. See TENN. SUP. CT. RULE 4(A)(1), (G)(1) (designating opinions not published in the
Southwestern Reporter as "persuasive" and not "controlling" authority to all persons other than
those who were parties to the case). Interestingly, although the Thompson opinion has never
been published in the Southwestern Reporter, the special supreme court that decided the case
designated it as "for publication." I brought this discrepancy to the attention of the office of the
Tennessee Attorney General (which is responsible for reporting supreme court decisions), and
the office suggested that it may have committed an error by not publishing the opinion. The
office also indicated that it might seek to correct the error by publishing the opinion now. If the
Thompson opinion is eventually published in the Southwestern Reporter, it would presumably
become binding precedent at that time.
144. 982 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1998).
145. See id. at 858.
146. See id. at 859.
147. See DeLaney v. Thompson, No. OAO-9806-CH-00304, 1998 WL 397363, at *1
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 16, 1998) (noting that the Chancery Court found the Tennessee Plan
unconstitutional because "it drastically limits the group of persons who can become appellate
judges" and "virtually insures the name of the incumbent on the ballot").
148. See id. at *5-8.
149. See DeLaney, 982 S.W.2d at 861 (holding that "the Tennessee Plan was inapplicable
to the election to fill [the appellate judge's] seat").
150. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to address this question, it is interesting
to ask whether it is comports with the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution to permit the
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five justices recused themselves and the governor named special justices to
replace them. 51 In Dunn, two of the five justices who heard the case were
special justices, including two of the four justices who comprised the majority
that upheld the Plan.' 52 Although, as a formal legal matter, decisions by special
justices are just as binding as those rendered by regularjustices, 153 the fact that
the Plan has never been upheld by a regular court has only added to its
controversy.
IV. Is THE TENNESSEE PLAN CONSTITUTIONAL?
As noted above, under the 1870 Tennessee constitution, all judges in the
state must be "elected by the qualified voters.' 54 For most of Tennessee's
history, that meant judges were initially placed into new terms and retained for
subsequent terms through contested elections.155 Under the Tennessee Plan,
however, judges are initially placed into new terms by gubernatorial
appointment, and judges are retained for subsequent terms by retention
referenda. 56 The question is whether these two devices-initial appointment
by the governor and the retention referendum-are consistent with the
constitutional requirement that all judges be "elected."
As explained below, it is hard to see how these devices are consistent with
the constitution. Moreover, to the extent any uncertainty existed over the
meaning of the Tennessee constitution, that uncertainty was arguably resolved
by the people of Tennessee in 1977 when they rejected an amendment to the
constitution that would have replaced the provision requiring elected judges
with one that would have permitted the Tennessee Plan.157 Indeed, of the
seventeen states that select judges by some mechanism of appointment
followed by a retention referendum, Tennessee is the only one that has not
revised its constitution to change a provision requiring elections in favor of a
provision setting forth the appointment-retention mechanism.158
governor, as he did in the Thompson case, to appoint an entire supreme court to hear a single
case after the issue in that case is already known. In these circumstances, the governor has an
unusual power to control the outcome of the case by appointing judges sympathetic to his views.
151. See supra text accompanying note 140.
152. See Dunn, 496 S.W.2d. at 491 (noting that Justices McAmis and Wilson joined the
majority as special justices).
153. See Ridout v. State, 30 S.W.2d 255, 257 (1930).
154. TEN. CONST. art. IV, §§ 3, 4.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 44.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 76-104.
157. See infra text accompanying notes 204-11.
158. See infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
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A. Are Judges "Elected" if They are Initially Appointed by the Governor?
Under the Tennessee Plan, judges are initially placed on the bench through
an appointment by the governor,15 9 and they can serve for as long as two years
before they are put before the people in retention referenda.' 60 Yet, Article VI
of the 1870 Tennessee constitution requires that all state judges be "elected by
the qualified voters."16' How can the two be reconciled?
The answer given by the Dunn court 162 refers to another part of the 1870
Tennessee constitution, Article VII, which states that "the filling of all
vacancies not otherwise directed or provided by this Constitution... shall be
made in such manner as the legislature shall direct."'' 63 But if the constitution
permits the legislature to fill judicial "vacancies" however it wishes, then what
effect would be left for the provision of the constitution requiring judicial
elections? That is, if any time a judge left office and a position became open
the legislature could empower the governor to appoint a replacement, then the
provision regarding vacancies would nullify the provision requiring an elected
judiciary.
The solution to this puzzle is that the authors of the 1870 constitution did
not intend the word "vacancies" in Article VII to include ajudicial position that
becomes available because a judge has served his or her entire term and
chooses not to run for reelection. Rather, the authors of the 1870 constitution
intended "vacancies" to mean interim judicial positions that became available
in the middle of a term, such as by the death or resignation of a judge.
Appointment is a common mechanism by which to fill interim vacancies in
states that otherwise elect office holders; it is often thought too expensive and
too cumbersome to hold a special election every time a someone leaves office
early. 164 Indeed, the Tennessee constitution explicitly prohibits special
elections for judges. 165
159. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-112(a) (2004 & Supp. 2007) ("When a vacancy occurs in
the office of an appellate court... by death, resignation or otherwise, the governor shall fill the
vacancy by appointing one (1) of three (3) persons nominated by the judicial selection
committee....").
160. See TENN. CODE. ANN. § 17-4-112(b) (2004 & Supp. 2007) ("The term of a judge
appointed under this section shall expire on August 31 after the next regular August election
occurring more than thirty (30) days after the vacancy occurs.").
161. TENN. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3,4.
162. See Shriver ex rel Higgins v. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480, 487 (Tenn. 1973).
163. TENN. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
164. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Judicial Nominating Commissions, 34 FORIDHAM
URB. L. J. 73, 77 (2007) ("The death or resignation of a judge from the active bench seriously
disrupts the work of the court, and the speedy selection of a replacement is important to the
litigants and the public. Most, perhaps virtually all, of these interim vacancies are filled by
gubernatorial appointment. In a few states, the legislature makes the appointment.
Alternatively, a state could choose a special election, but that method entails uncertainty, delay,
and costs. Appointment is the better method of filling vacancies."); Daniel R. Deja, How
Judges are Selected, 75 MICH. B.J. 904, 906 (1996) ("Judges die or resign from office on
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It is apparent from a neighboring provision in Article VII that the authors
of the 1870 constitution used the word "vacancies" there to refer only to interim
vacancies. The neighboring provision states that "[n]o appointment... to fill a
vacancy shall be made for a period extending beyond the unexpired term. '166
By limiting the legislature's ability to fill vacancies only for the rest of an
"unexpired term," the authors of the 1870 constitution indicated that they
intended for the legislature to fill only those vacancies with unexpired terms-
i.e., only those that occur in the middle of a term (such as by death or
resignation) and not those that occur when a judge serves his or her entire term
but chooses not to run for reelection (in which case there is no "unexpired
term" remaining).
Thus, to the extent the Tennessee Plan permits the governor to appoint a
new judge to a position created when the previous judge served his or her full
term, the Plan would appear unconstitutional.
None of the courts that have considered the constitutionality of the
Tennessee Plan have addressed this point. Indeed, not only has this point never
been addressed, but the two Tennessee Supreme Court opinions that upheld the
Tennessee Plan are not even necessarily to the contrary. In both Dunn and
Thompson, the vacancy occurred in the middle of a term. 67 There is no doubt
that this is the kind of vacancy that the Tennessee constitution permits the
legislature to fill in whatever manner it chooses. 168 With respect to other
vacancies, however-those that occur when a judge completes his or her term
and does not run for reelection-it is hard to see how the initial appointment
device of the Tennessee Plan is constitutional.
B. Are Retention Referenda "Elections "?
As the supreme court in Dunn noted, the 1870 constitution does not
explicitly say whether a retention referendum qualifies as an "election.' 69 The
court thought, however, that the constitution answered this question elsewhere.
The court found three provisions in the constitution where the word "election"
is used to describe a vote that, much like a retention referendum, poses only a
schedules that are determined by factors other than the dates of general elections. The cost and
time needed to schedule special elections is generally prohibitive. The presumption is that
gubernatorial appointment is a more expedient and cost-efficient means of filling judicial
vacancies.")
165. See TENN. CONST. art. VII, § 5 ("No special election shall be held to fill a vacancy in
the office of Judge ....").
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. See State ex rel Higgins v. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480,482,491 (Tenn. 1973); State ex rel
Hooker v. Thompson, 1996 WL 570090, at * 1 n. 1 (Tenn. Oct. 2, 1996) (noting that Justice
White had been initially appointed to fill the unexpired term of Justice O'Brien).
168. See TENN. CONST. art. VII, § 4 ("[T]he filling of all vacancies not otherwise directed
or provided by the Constitution, shall be made in such manner as the Legislature shall direct.").
169. Dunn. 496 S.W.2d at 487.
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yes-or-no question to the voters. 170  One of these provisions requires an
"election" to authorize a municipal government to loan its credit to others;' 7
another requires amendments to the constitution to be approved "at an
election"; 17' and another requires a variety of other municipal acts to be ratified
"in an election."'173 In each of these instances, the constitution refers not to a
vote that is contested between two people, but to one that asks for an up or
down decision by the voters. The court extrapolated from these three
provisions to conclude that the retention referendum mechanism in the
Tennessee Plan qualified as an "election" as well.
174
There are several difficulties with extrapolating from these three examples
to a conclusion that the word "election" in Article VI must include uncontested,
yes-or-no votes on the tenure of public officials. The first difficulty is the one
raised by Justice Humphreys in Dunn: If a retention referendum can be an
"election" for judges, why not also for other public officials, such as legislators
or even the governor? 75 The majority did not respond to this argument, and
there is good reason for that: The argument is hard to answer. One might be
able to distinguish the constitutional provision requiring the election of
legislators from that requiring the election ofjudges: The former says that the
legislature shall be "dependent on the people,"' 76 whereas the latter says that
judges "shall be elected,"' 77 and one might argue that the former implies a
different, more democratic form of election than the latter. It is quite difficult,
however, to distinguish the provision requiring the election of the governor.
Like the provision for judges, the provision for the governor says simply that
the "governor shall be elected.'0 78 Thus, if Dunn is correct, then the legislature
might permit governors to win second terms in uncontested retention
referenda-a proposition few would believe is consistent with the democratic
guarantees of the Tennessee constitution.
There are other difficulties with the Dunn analysis. For example, two of
the three examples relied upon by the court were not even part of the 1870
constitution; they were added many decades later, in 1953. '7 These two
examples are, therefore, of little probative value in discerning what the authors
of the 1870 constitution meant when they used the word "elected." In addition,
all three examples relied upon in Dunn involved votes on ballot propositions as
opposed to votes on public officials. Voting on ballot propositions has almost
always taken place in the form of yes-or-no votes-the proposition is either
170. See id. at 489.
171. TENN. CONST. art. II, § 29.
172. Id. art. XI, § 3.
173. Id. art. X1, § 9.
174. See Dunn, 496 S.W.2d at 489.
175. See id. at 493 (Humphreys, J., dissenting).
176. TENN. CONST. art. II, § 3.
177. Id. art VI, §§ 3, 4.
178. Id. art. III, § 4.
179. See id. art. XI, §§ 3, 9.
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agreed to or not.180 By contrast, voting for public officials has rarely taken
place-and, for most of American history, had never taken place-in the yes-
or-no form.181 The fact that the 1870 constitution once uses the word "election"
to refer to a yes-or-no vote in the ballot proposition context, where such votes
have almost always taken place in the yes-or-no form, does not answer the
question whether the word "election" means the same thing in the different
context of public officials, where such votes have almost never taken place in
the yes-or-no form.
But perhaps the greatest difficulty with the conclusion that the authors of
the 1870 constitution intended the word "election" to include retention
referenda is that such referenda appear to have been unknown in the United
States at that time. The first retention referendum was adopted in the United
States in 1934,182 and the very idea of a retention referendum for public
officials was not even conceived until 1914, when it was first proposed by a
law professor at Northwestern University. 83 It is, obviously, impossible for the
authors of the 1870 constitution to have intended that document to encompass
something that did not yet exist. No court considering the constitutionality of
the Tennessee Plan has addressed this point.
Of course, the authors of the 1870 constitution did not know many of the
things that we know today. Many scholars believe it would be cumbersome
and impractical to force legislatures to amend their constitutions every time
they wanted to take advantage of a new idea or a new technology; these
scholars believe that the meanings of constitutional provisions should change
over time to encompass new ideas so long as the new ideas serve the old
purposes.184 This reasoning is especially appropriate in this case because, as
180. The only possible exception of which I am aware is the dilemma that is occasionally
created by "conflicting ballot propositions." See Philip L. Dubois & Floyd Feeney, LAWMAKING
BY INITIATIE 158-163 (1998). In a small handful of states, voters can be given a choice
between two competing ballot questions. See id. at 160-61 (listing the states of Washington,
Maine, Mississippi, and Massachusetts). This practice has never been followed in Tennessee,
see id. at 158-163, and, even in the states in which it is practiced, it arose during the
Progressive Era and well after the 1870 constitution was written. See ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3,
§ 18 (approved in 1909); MASS. CONST. amend. Art. XLVIII, Init., pt. 6 (approved in 1918);
MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273 (approved 1912); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1 (amended in 1911).
181. See infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
182. See CARBoN & BERKSON, supra note 51, at 11.
183. See id. at 2. Of course, other mechanisms of removing public officials from office
were well known in 1870, including impeachment and recall. Until the Progressive Era,
however, it appears that neither of these mechanisms had ever been placed directly in the hands
of the electorate. Thus, even the closest analogue to the retention referendum-the recall
election-post-dated the 1870 Convention. See Rod Farmer, Power to the People: The
Progressive Movement for the Recall 1890s-1920, 57 NEW ENG. J. HIST. 59, 62, 64 (2001);
Joshua Spivak, California's Recall: Adoption of the "Grand Bounce "for the Elected Officials,
CAL. HIST., Mar. 22, 2004, at 22.
184. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman,Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 381, 395 (1997) (noting
that many scholars and judges believe that the Constitution should be interpreted "by
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the Dunn court noted, the 1870 constitution explicitly confers flexibility on the
legislature in deciding the "manner" in which judicial elections should take
place where the constitution does not otherwise provide. 8 5 Thus, even though
the retention referendum was unknown in 1870, the device nonetheless may be
constitutional because it serves the democratic purposes of the 1870
constitution just as well as contested elections do. There are a number of
reasons, however, to doubt that retention referenda do a very good job of
facilitating democratic accountability.
First among these reasons is the fact that retention referenda were originally
designed to insulate judges from public accountability. The architects of merit
selection in the early nineteenth century favored life tenure for judges, but
feared that the post-Jacksonian public would no longer accept this as they once
had.186 Thus, the architects of merit selection came up with what some scholars
have concluded was a "sop" to the public: the retention referendum. 87 That is,
the retention referendum was designed to make the public feel as though they
had a role in selecting their judges but make it unlikely they would exercise that
role by voting a judge off the bench. 88
The experience with retention referenda has vindicated its design. Scholars
have found that judges virtually never lose retention referenda. In the most
comprehensive study, which examined over thirty years of data in ten states,
judges running in retention referenda were returned to office 98.9% of the
time.189 Even that incredibly high number is misleading, however, because
over half of the defeats were from Illinois, a state that requires judges to win
60% of the vote rather than a mere majority (as do Tennessee and most other
states) in order to stay on the bench. 190 Removing the Illinois defeats from the
data where the judges won more than 50% but less than 60% of the vote yields
a retention rate of 99.5%.191 By contrast, judges who run for reelection in states
that use contested elections are defeated much more often. One comprehensive
study of state supreme court races between 1980 and 2000 showed that justices
running for reelection in states that use partisan elections were defeated nearly
23% of the time-a full thirteen times as often as justices running in retention
'translating' the Framers' concepts into modem circumstances").
185. TENN. CONST. art. VII, § 4 ("The election of all officers ... not otherwise directed or
provided by this Constitution, shall be made in such manner as the legislature shall direct.").
186. See CARBON & BERKSON, supra note 51, at 6, 8.
187. See, e.g., id. at 8, 10 (noting that the architects "perceived retention as a 'sop' to those
committed to electoral control over the judiciary").
188. See, e.g., Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Quest for a System of Judicial "Merit"
Selection, 67 ALB. L. REv. 803, 806 (2004) ("Merit selection uses the public as participants in
what is predetermined to be a useless exercise designed to ensure the retention of the
incumbent.").
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referenda over the same period. 192 As the author of that study has noted, in
states that use contested elections, "supreme court justices face competition that
is, by two or three measures, equivalent if not higher to that for the U.S.
House."'
' 93
The experience in Tennessee is in line with these studies. As noted above,
there have been 146 retention referenda in Tennessee, and in every single
referendum but one (99.3%), the voters retained the incumbent.' 94
It is unclear why the public so infrequently votes against retention. One
possible theory is that, without another candidate in the race, there is no one
with an interest in providing information to the public about the incumbent. 195
Another possible theory is that, in this atmosphere of inadequate information,
the absence of a political trademark-affiliation with a political party-makes it
especially hard for voters to assess whether to retain a public official.
96
Finally, some commentators believe that voters are reluctant to vote against an
incumbent if they have no idea who will replace the incumbent--the devil you
know is preferable to the devil you don't."'1' Regardless of the reason for the
high rates of retention, scholars have concluded that, in light of the fact that
these judges are a virtual lock to keep their seats, "those who maintain that
retention elections serve to insulate judges from popular control seem to be
correct.'
198
It should be noted that the Tennessee Plan is a bit different from many of
the merit selection plans used in other states insofar as judges appointed under
the Plan do not automatically run in retention referenda. Rather, they do so
only if the judicial evaluation commission recommends that the public retain
them; if the commission votes the other way, they must run in a contested
election. 199 Thus, in assessing the accountability offered by the Tennessee
Plan, the fact that the commission might not grant some judges the security of
retention referenda should be considered. It appears, however, that this feature
of the Tennessee Plan has not transformed it into a device of democratic
192. See Melinda Gann Hall, Competition as Accountability in State Supreme Court
Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE 177 (Matthew Streb ed., 2007) (finding that 22.9% of state
supreme court incumbents were defeated in partisan elections while only 1.8% of incumbents
were defeated in retention referenda between 1980 and 2000).
193. Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the
Myths of Judicial Reform, 95 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 315, 319 (2001).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
195. See, e.g., Dimino, supra note 188, at 805 ("By removing challengers from the ballot,
retention races eliminate the public figures most likely to motivate and organize opposition to
the incumbent.").
196. Political scientists believe "that the most important cue for voters is political party
affiliation. Party labels are signals... and voters rely heavily on them." Kritzer, supra note 6,
at 433 (footnote omitted).
197. See STUMPF, supra note 6, at 170 ("You can't beat somebody with nobody.").
198. William K. Hall& Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years ofJudicial Retention Elections
Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 347 (1987).
199. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-4-114(c), -115(c) (Supp. 2007).
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accountability. Since the commission was created in 1994, it has rendered
sixty-six evaluations. 20 In every single one, the commission recommended that
the judge be retained.20'
Despite the limitations of retention referenda, there are some reasons to
think that they are no less democratic than the contested elections that preceded
them. Although judges who run in referenda are virtually guaranteed to win,
they nonetheless report on surveys that theprospect of running in the referenda
influences their decisions on the bench.202 Thus, it is possible that retention
referenda produce judges that are accountable to the public even though they do
not produce judges who get defeated. Moreover, it bears reiterating that, even
when contested elections were used to select appellate judges in Tennessee, the
races were often not very spirited. As noted above most judges still came to the
bench through gubernatorial appointment, and, in a state that was for a long
time controlled by one political party, even the reelection campaigns often were
not contested.0 3 Thus, even if retention referenda are largely coronations, it is
not entirely clear that, at least as an historical matter, contested elections were
much different. For this reason, the case against the constitutionality of the
Tennessee Plan's provision for retention referenda is not as strong as it is
against the provision calling for gubernatorial appointment of all appellate
judges in the first instance.
C. What About the Failed Amendment of 1977?
Much of the uncertainty over the constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan
might have been resolved in 1977. That year, a limited Constitutional
Convention proposed to the peole of Tennessee thirteen separate amendments
to the Tennessee constitution. 2  The thirteen amendments covered topics as
diverse as repealing the 1870 constitution's ban on interracial marriage to
repealing the 1870 constitution's prohibition on charging interest rates of more
than 10%.205 One of the amendments would have made several changes to the
judiciary, including repeal of the 1870 constitution's requirement that all judges
"shall be elected" in favor of a provision stating that "Justices of the Supreme
Court and judges of the Court of Appeals shall be appointed by the Governor
from three nominees recommended ... by the Appellate Court Nominating
Commission" and that "[t]he name of each justice and judge seeking retention
shall be submitted to the qualified voters for retention or rejection ... at the
expiration of each six year term., 20 6 In other words, the proposed amendment
200. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
201. See id.
202. See Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77
JUDICATURE 306, 312-13 (1994).
203. See Parks, supra note 36, at 629-30.
204. See LASKA, supra note 73, at 23-25.
205. See id. at 24-25.
206. See Governor Ray Blanton, Proclamation by the Governor, in THE LIMITED
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would have replaced the constitution's requirement of an elected judiciary with
the Tennessee Plan.
Voters approved each of the thirteen proposed amendments submitted to
the public from the 1977 Convention except the amendment that would have
inserted the Tennessee Plan into the constitution.2 °7 As one historian has noted,
this amendment "became the first amendment ever offered by a limited
convention to face voter rejection." 208
The fact that voters rejected putting the Tennessee Plan into the
constitution when given the chance is a powerful, but not conclusive, point in
favor of the view that the Tennessee Plan is unconstitutional. The amendment
containing the Tennessee Plan would have made many other significant
changes to the judicial branch, including the designation of a uniform
jurisdiction for all trial courts and the creation of a statewide public defender
program.20 9 It is possible that the voters favored the Tennessee Plan but
rejected the amendment for the other changes it would have made to the
judicial branch. Indeed, the Tennessee Plan does not appear to have been the
most controversial part of the proposed amendment.210 It is also possible that
the voters favored the Tennessee Plan but rejected the amendment because they
thought the constitution already permitted the Plan.
Despite the ambiguous meaning of rejected constitutional amendments, it is
certainly not uncommon to use them to interpret the meaning of a
constitution. 211  Nonetheless, the Tennessee Supreme Court has never
addressed the events of 1977 in any of its opinions regarding the
constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan. This is even more surprising in light of
the constitutional experience of other states with similar methods of judicial
selection. Of the seventeen states that rely upon appointment by the governor
followed by a retention referendum, 212 Tennessee is the only one that has not
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1977, STATE OF TENNESSEE, THE JOuRNAL OF THE DEBATES OF
THE LIMITED CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1977 (see Proposal 13, § 4).
207. See LASKA, supra note 73, at 25-26.
208. Id. at 26.
209. See id. ("All trial courts were to have uniform jurisdiction, and the legislature was
restricted in creating new types of courts; the Missouri Plan was approved for appellate judges.
Provision was made for a chief court administrator. The legislature was required to set up a
statewide public defender program.").
210. Seeid.at24-25.
211. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 111 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("If the Framers had meant the Amendment to bar federal-question suits as well,
they could not only have made their intentions clearer very easily, but could simply have
adopted the first post-Chisholm proposal, introduced in the House of Representatives by
Theodore Sedgwick...."); David B. Kopel, It Isn't About Duck Hunting: The British Origins
of the Right to Arms, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1357 (1995) (arguing that "the 'National Guard'
interpretation of the Second Amendment amounts to an Orwellian reversal [by] treating the
enacted Amendment that guarantees the right of the people as having a meaning identical to a
proposed but rejected amendment dealing with the rights of states").
212. The seventeen states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana,
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revised its constitution to change a requirement of an elected judiciary in favor
of a provision setting forth the appointment-retention mechanism.2  Courts
often interpret constitutions in light of how neighboring jurisdictions have
214treated similar provisions in their own constitutions. When the voters'
decision in 1977 is juxtaposed against the experience in every other state, it
becomes even harder to conclude that the Tennessee Plan is consistent with the
constitution. Again, although this point might not be dispositive on its own,
when combined with the other serious doubts about the Tennessee Plan, the
case against its constitutionality becomes close to compelling.
V. CONCLUSION
Ever since it was enacted in 1971, the Tennessee Plan has been
controversial, and its greatest controversy has always been whether it is
constitutional. Although the Tennessee Supreme Court has twice said that it is,
neither of these decisions was supported by a majority of regular supreme court
justices, one decision was unpublished and therefore is not even binding, and,
most importantly of all, both of these decisions left serious constitutional
questions unanswered. The most serious of these questions is how the
constitution's requirement that all judges be "elected" can be squared with the
Plan's requirement that all judges be appointed by the governor. Although the
constitution permits the governor to appoint judges to "vacancies," it seems
rather clear that the constitution means only interim vacancies. Thus, to the
extent the Tennessee Plan calls for the governor to appoint judges to positions
where their predecessors completed their full terms, it is hard to come to any
conclusion other than that the Tennessee Plan is unconstitutional.
There are also serious doubts that the feature of the Tennessee Plan
requiring judges to run for reelection in uncontested retention referenda is
consistent with the constitution. Although these doubts are not as strong as
those surrounding the feature of the Plan requiring gubernatorial appointment,
when combined with the fact that the voters of Tennessee rejected a
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. See American Judicature Society, Methods of Judicial
Selection: Selection of Judges State-by-State Report, available at http://www.judicial
selection.us/judicialselection/methods/selection ofjudges.cfin?state= (last visited Feb. 25,
2008).
213. See ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 5,6; ARIz. CONST. art. VI, §§ 37, 38; CAL. CONST. art.
VI, § 16(d); COLO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 20, 25; FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 10, 11; IND. CONST. art.
VII, §§ 10, 11; IOWA CONST. art. V, §§ 15, 17; KAN. CONST. art. III, § 5; MD. CONST. art. IV, §
5A; MO. CONST. art. V, § 25; NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21; N.M. CONST. art. VI, §§ 33, 35; OKLA.
CONST. art. VII, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7; UTAH CONST. art. VIII, §§ 8,9; WYO. CONST. art.
V, § 4.
214. See, e.g., Richardson v. Tenn. Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 453 (Tenn. 1995)
("careful[ly] examin[ing] cases . . . in other states" to resolve a question of Tennessee
constitutional law).
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constitutional amendment that would have explicitly adopted the Tennessee
Plan, these doubts, too, become compelling. It is rare that we have explicit
instructions from the body politic as to what a constitutional provision means;
the public's rejection of the 1977 amendment is often as close as we ever come.
For these reasons, I am persuaded that the best reading of the Tennessee
constitution is one that holds the Tennessee Plan unconstitutional. If we are to
have merit selection in Tennessee, then the proponents of merit selection
should do what they could not do in 1977: persuade the voters to pass a
constitutional amendment. Until then, the legislature-duty bound as it is to
uphold the Tennessee constitution2 1 5-should do what it needs to do to return
the selection of appellate judges to contested elections. The easiest way to
accomplish this task would be to take no action in June 2009 when the
operative pieces of the Tennessee Plan-the judicial nominating and evaluation
commissions-are scheduled to terminate. 21 6 If the legislature allows the
commissions to terminate-and does not adopt a new system in the
meantime-then appellate judges in Tennessee should revert by default to
initial selection and retention in contested elections.217 In short, as the Wall
Street Journal recently put it, "the best thing [the legislature] can do is nothing
at all. 218 +
215. See TENN. CONST. art. X, § 2 ("Each member of the Senate and House of
Representatives, shall before they proceed to business take an oath or affirmation to support the
Constitution of this State .... 9).
216. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note. 11.
218. Tennessee's Trial Run, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2008, at A10.
+ [EDITOR'S NOTE: Professor Penny White and Malia Reddick, Ph.D., have written a
response to this Essay. It may be found at 75 TENN. L. Rnv. 501 (2008). In addition, Professor
Fitzpatrick has written a reply to their response, which is posted at http://papers.ssm.com/
abstract=-1 152413.]
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